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I. Introduction
The creation of the International Olympic Committee (hereinafter IOC) by 
Pierre de Coubertin in 1894 was the milestone for the global promotion of sport 
activities. De Coubertin’s objective was not only to re-establish the Olympic 
Games of ancient Greece but also to advocate for an idealistic concept of a 
transnational sport competition spirit that could help elevate the global human 
community to better moral values.1 In his opinion, this would be possible through 
sport’s organisational autonomy. In the matter of the Olympic Games, the Olym-
pic Movement should have competence in creating transnational norms in 
sports without being bound to any specific substantive legislation or government 
intervention. Therefore, it should also be responsible for the self-governance of 
transnational sport organisation.2 This concept is known as lex sportiva,3 a term 
with no official legal description. 
The establishment of the IOC laid down the foundations and principles of 
global sport organisation as we know it today in the present legal, institutional 
and economic context and communicated the global nature of sport to the wider 
public and national governments. Although the IOC attracted much of the spot-
light, the humble sport activity of football begun its history quite earlier than the 
IOC and today football is the backbone of a multibillion global industry.4 It was 
in 1863 that the first Football Association was established in Great Britain. Soon 
after, football associations appeared in France (1870)5 the Netherlands and Den-
mark (1889) New Zealand (1891), Argentina (1893), Chile (1895),  Switzerland, 
Belgium (1895), Italy (1898), Germany, Uruguay (both in 1900), Hungary (1901) 
1 mARtinKoVA (2016).
2 International Olympic Committee (2017), Olympic Charter in force as from September 2017, in https://
stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga= 
2.241435522.1063922124.1516281581-700252627.1515116261 (15.01.2018). The Fifth Principle of 
Olympism in the latest Olympic Charter states that 
Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organisations within the Olym-
pic Movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing 
and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, 
enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that 
principles of good governance be applied.
3 Some authors are proposing a distinction between the lex sportiva as a transnational autonomous 
legal order created by the norms produced by international sporting federations which function under a 
formal contract basis combined with submission to the jurisdiction of sporting federations by athletes and 
others who come under its jurisdiction, with the Court of Arbitration for Sport as its unique forum, and the 
lex ludica which describes the formal rules and the equitable principles of sport which can be enforced by 
national courts, see lindholm (2015); VAleRo (2014); sieKmAnn (2011); FosteR (2005).
4 mARKoVits, RensmAnn (2010), p. 43.
5 teRRet (2016), p. 34.
CatólicaLawReview V2N2_4as provas.indb   116 17/07/18   11:54
117VOLUME II \ n.º 2 \ maio 2018
Global labour market for professional football players and contract law \ 
Vasiliki Fasoula
and Finland (1907).6 The International Federation of Football Associations (here-
inafter FIFA) was created in 1904 by seven founder members and to this day it 
has 211 members worldwide. In Europe, the Union of European Football Asso-
ciations (hereinafter UEFA) consists of 55 member associations. Both bodies 
are private entities that hold a monopoly on regulating competitive sports at 
an international level and they have their current head offices in Switzerland. 
The governance of such a global industry involving multi-stakeholder interests, 
pushes the limits of the division between private contractual liberty of the par-
ties and public regulation as we know it so far in the European continental legal 
tradition. The transnational supply and demand in the football market makes the 
mobility and migration of players worldwide a significant condition to the football 
clubs success, as they are always looking to sign up the best talents that can 
offer them a competitive advantage compared to their opponents in the sports 
market with high levels of economic reward.7 
The players’ contracts are an expression of the autonomous choices of con-
tracting parties. The freedom of contract is a fundamental tenet of contract law 
in all open market economies providing legal predictability and security in market 
transactions.8 The asymmetry of information between the contracting parties 
may put some parties in a more disadvantaged position that the other. In order 
to restore the contractual balance between the parties, the State may, for public 
interest reasons, set the framework for specific contracts in order to protect the 
weaker party to the contract.9 The courts may also be called by the parties to 
intervene in the interpretation of a contract during a civil law litigation or during 
arbitration. One category of contracts where the State may set the framework 
is employment contracts, negotiated individually by the parties or following a 
collective agreement negotiated by official social partners according to the na-
tional legislation.10 In sports, the national legal framework that applies within the 
limits of that national jurisdiction allows sports federations and sports governing 
bodies to set-up their own internal statutes and regulations, as well as to enforce 
these regulations in relation to their members and other affiliated persons. How-
ever, some of these national status and regulations are enacted by transnational 
private sport bodies, such as FIFA, UEFA etc. and have a worldwide reach.11 In 
6 La Fédération Internationale de Football Association-FIFA.com (2017), History of the game, in http://
www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/the-game/index.html (15.01.2018).
7 poli (2010), p. 491; mAGee, sUGden (2002), p. 421. 
8 poUnd (1909); hooK (2016).
9 omAn (2016).
10 GRUsic (2015).
11 For a collection of national sports legislations worldwide see GUROVITS (2018). 
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the absence of an international public legal order for sport, controlling the validity 
of their normative autonomy becomes a complex matter with socio-economic 
implications. 
II. The contractual chain linking transnational football 
federations and their members
Just like corporations, international sport federations can have a legal per-
sonality after the adoption of their statutes and bylaws/regulations. The rep-
resentatives of the national federations of the same sport discipline must be 
united in a Congress that will discuss and adopt the statutes of the international 
federation of that same sport discipline. The affiliation of national federations to 
their international sport body is also of a contractual nature. The membership 
agreement is a consensual contract and it is needed in order for the national 
federations to participate in international sport competitions. It also means that 
members adhere to all the regulations of the international body and may be 
sanctioned if they do not operate in total conformity with them. By a hierar-
chical chain of membership contracts, transnational regulations are binding to 
the clubs that are members of national federations and by consequence to the 
players registered to those clubs. The norms produced by transnational sporting 
bodies are accepted by their members under the principle pacta sunt servanda 
since there is no delegation of public international power to these bodies.12 
The organisation of international competitions falls in the scope of compe-
tence of transnational sport bodies. The structure of the labour market of pro-
fessional players in such competitions includes organisational rules on teams’ 
composition, players’ assignment to teams, for example rules to assign new 
players between clubs or geographic zones from which clubs are allowed to sign 
up new players. These rules may take the form of contractual clauses restricting 
the free mobility of players between clubs coupled with time restrictions or even 
establishing a specific fee payment system. It also includes the players payment 
and wage determination process – like salary cap arrangements, periodicity of 
wage-setting and the role of player agents and unions – and the formation of the 
players list by establishing justified restrictions on the criteria of players on the 
list and their maximum or minimum number.13 In professional football, national 
contracts of employment between players and their club as well as between of-
ficials and their club usually incorporate in their terms the rules under which the 
12 RAbU (2010), pp. 144-154.
13 boRlAnd (2006).
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club operates within the sporting body of which it is a member. Regulation of this 
type usually limits the freedom of the employing club and the player to negotiate 
their own terms on the contract. In some sports the rules require explicitly the 
contracts of players, coaches and managers to conform to a specific model pre-
scribed by the organisational rules stemming from transnational sporting bodies 
that bound its members.14 
Transnational sport bodies have to find a balance in their rules between the 
sometimes conflicting interests of the clubs that want to keep their best talents 
and the players that may want to explore better working opportunities in anoth-
er club. Professional football players are usually contracted under a fixed-term 
contract with the club. If a player wants to change clubs before the expiration 
of his contract, he is considered in breach of his contractual agreement and he 
has to compensate his former club. This procedure is known as a transfer and 
if the player moves to another country’s club, the procedure is known as an in-
ternational transfer. In the absence of an international legislation on the matter, 
the void is filled by the norms stemming from transnational sport bodies;15 in this 
case, the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter RSTP) 
of FIFA.16 These regulations are compared to «a parallel transnational labour law 
applicable exclusively to professional football players and their employers»17 and 
have three specificities: the compensation owned is much higher, even exagger-
ated, than the one due in case of a contractual breach by any other worker; if it 
is not paid, FIFA can issue temporary bans against the player and his future club 
and if the player moving is under 23 years old a training compensation may also 
be due to the clubs who contributed to his professional training.
In 1965 the French, Scottish, English, Italian and Dutch football players’ 
associations established the Fédération Internationale des Associations de 
Footballeurs Professionnels (hereinafter FIFPro) as an international representa-
tive federation for professional players. Until the mid-nineties it had a marginal 
negotiation power over FIFA and UEFA and players who wanted to challenge 
their contracts had to act individually.18 In fact, it is because of these individuals 
who challenged the validity of their contracts under European law provisions 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) that FIFA 
and UEFA begun negotiating their regulations with FIFPro and the European 
14 beloFF (2012).
15 eliAsson (2009), p. 386.
16 La Fédération Internationale de Football Association-FIFA.com (2017), Regulations on the Sta-
tus and Transfer of Players 2018, in http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administra-
tion/02/92/54/37/ regulationsonthestatusandtransferofplayersdez2017webeng_neutral.pdf (15.01.2018).
17 dUVAl (2016), p. 84.
18 GeeRAeRt (2016), pp. 72-74.
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Commission. The importance of the European legislation and case law in creat-
ing a framework for an industry that has been always proclaiming its legal and 
institutional autonomy can be resumed in the phrase that «the European Union 
remains to this date the only international governmental organisation to have im-
posed to international sport organisations such profound modifications of their 
rules».19
III. The effect of the CJEU on the interaction between freedom 
of movement for workers and contractual freedom 
The composition of professional football clubs has been part of the regulato-
ry/organisational aspect of sport falling in the competence of transnational foot-
ball bodies. The early regulations provided a system of nationality-based quotas 
on the composition of football teams by national and foreigner players. The jus-
tification of that system was that the popularity of football was an important 
factor of shaping the national identity of supporters with wider social implications 
concerning social cohesion, education and job opportunities especially for the 
youth of the country where the club was registered. International federations 
were defending a vague notion of «purely sporting rules exception» that would 
allow them to adopt regulations including restrictions to the European provisions 
of free movement. In the Lisbon Treaty, the free movement of workers is protect-
ed under article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (here-
inafter TFEU).20 The CJEU has ruled that the definition of «worker» protected 
under article 45 TFEU is a matter of European law and does not depend on the 
various definitions of the term by Member States’ national legislations that could 
otherwise bypass the free movement objectives of the European Treaties.21
19 mièGe (2017), p. 278.
20 Art. 45 TFEU states that 
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. 2. Such freedom of movement 
shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member 
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 3. It 
shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the territory of Mem-
ber States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance 
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in 
that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Com-
mission. 4. The provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in the public service.
21 CJ, 19.03.1964, Case 75/63, Mrs M.K.H. Hoekstra (née Unger) v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor 
Detailhandel en Ambachten, ECLI:EU:C:1964:19; TEYSSIÉ (2013), p. 108. 
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In the Walrave case the CJCE ruled that a prohibition based on nationality 
«does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, 
the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has 
nothing to do with economic activity (…) this restriction on the scope of the 
provisions in question must however remain limited to its proper objective».22 By 
this formulation the Court made clear that rules laid down by sporting federa-
tions, limiting or restricting the free movement of professional sportsmen based 
on nationality, could be found to be infringing the European provisions of free 
movement of workers within the internal market. According to the CJCE, the 
European Treaty would not apply to economic sporting activities only if the mo-
tive for the proportionate rule was a non-economic or a «purely sporting» one.23
Two years later in the Donà case, where a football agent challenged the na-
tionality and residence preconditions imposed by the Italian Football Federation 
excluding players from another member of the European Union to participate in 
the national Italian Championship, the CJEU made clear that professional and 
semi-professional football players are encompassed by the definition of «work-
ers» under article 45 TFEU. It also ruled the exclusion of foreign players «from 
participation in certain matches for the reasons which are not of an economic 
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are 
thus, only, of sporting interest».24 The notion of purely sporting rules was inter-
preted by the CJEU in a way that meant that sporting rules could be exempted 
from a compatibility control with European law if they produced an economic 
effect but were based on non-economic motives that relate to the particular 
nature and context of certain matches and are proportionate to this objective. 
It is argued that this purely sporting exception should not be applying to rules 
on team composition in a general manner but only to nationality rules in national 
team sports.25 
It seems that the unfortunate wording of «purely sporting interest» formulat-
ed by the Court was used by the sporting industry as a suggestion of a clean 
separation between rules of purely sporting interest and rules with an economic 
impact. This separation would provide a legitimate justification for the interna-
tional federations to keep avoiding a compatibility control of their regulations 
with the European legal order even when these rules have detrimental economic 
consequences for individuals. It is however more likely that by imposing the 
sporting exception to be proportionate to its non-economic objective the CJEU 
22 CJ, 12.12.1974, Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, 
paras 8-9.
23 lAtty (2007), p. 698.
24 CJ, 14.07.1976, Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, para 14.
25 pARRish, miettinen (2008), p. 100.
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wanted to make clear that the evaluation of the limits of the autonomy granted 
to sports federations to set rules undisturbed by the demands of European leg-
islation was a matter of judicial control.26 After these two decisions of the CJEU, 
the European Commission was encouraged, in the late seventies, to engage the 
European sporting authorities in a dialogue in order to revisit the UEFA rules that 
were imposing quotas to the number of foreign players in professional football 
clubs. These efforts gave no result mostly because the football federations de-
fended strongly their normative autonomy and independence from any national 
or supra-national substantive law.27
In the years following these two rulings the commercial value of football in-
dustry grew immensely28 and it coincided with a swift of the political and eco-
nomic focus of the European Commission and the CJEU to a more vigorous 
enforcement of internal market law coupled with the de-regulation of various 
economic sectors. Until the Bosman29 case in 1993, professional players were 
unable to exercise their contractual freedom, like any other worker, to move be-
tween clubs-employers. For a professional football player to participate in official 
matches under his club, the player’s registration which is held by the previous 
club had to be secured. That registration would be released only when the pre-
vious club was satisfied with the terms offered by the new club, including the 
payment of a fee. The Bosman case essentially placed under judicial scrutiny the 
discriminatory «3+2» regulation established by UEFA and had been drawn up in 
collaboration with the Commission. That regulation imposed nationality – based 
quotas in fielding foreign players and also imposed non-discriminatory transfer 
fee rules which restricted the professional – and therefore economic – activities 
of football players. 
In this particular case, a professional footballer named Bosman, was not 
considered free to sign for any other club willing to employ him at the end of his 
contract of employment with his former club-employer, the Royal club liégois. 
Any interested club would have to pay a fee to Royal club liégois in order to ob-
tain the transfer certificate. The CJEU ruled that this duty to buyout the right to 
contract with an out-of-contract player was considered an obstacle to freedom 
of movement for workers. Despite the formulation of the transfer rules by UEFA 
stipulating that the business relationship between the two clubs is to exert no 
26 weAtheRill (2007), p. 49.
27 mièGe (2017), p. 51.
28 In a consultation document by the European Commission in 1999 on the european sporting model the 
most significant steps of sport industry are traced: the participation of professional athletes to the Olympic 
games in 1981, the commercialisation of Olympic symbols and trademarks in 1980, the deregulation of the 
public audio-visual sector and the high demand for tv sports rights at the late 1980s. 
29 CJCE, 15.12.1995, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and 
others v. Bosman and others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463.
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influence on the activity of the player, who is to be free to play for his new club, 
«the new club must still pay the fee in issue, under pain of penalties which may 
include its being struck off for debt, which prevents it just as effectively from 
signing up a player from a club in another Member State without paying that 
fee».30 This means that restrictive measures which are non-discriminatory, like 
the transfer fee, are also subject to Article 45 TFEU if they are an «excessive 
obstacle to the freedom of movement».31
The importance of the judge’s reasoning is that the significant impact of or-
ganisation rules on a club’s willingness to recruit a player constitutes a restrictive 
practice opposing the free movement of workers that is transposable to in-con-
tract players subjected to the compensation and sanctions of non-payment 
imposed by the FIFA RSTP as well.32 The CJEU in its famous paragraph 106 
recognized that in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activi-
ties and in particular football in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance 
between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to 
results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must 
be accepted as legitimate. The general notion of «social importance of sporting 
activities» is often promoted by both FIFA and UEFA to justify their regulatory 
choices. The CJEU abolished the quotas based on nationality discrimination 
and as far as the transfer fees for expired contracts are concerned they were 
found to be not proportionate to attain the legitimate objectives recognised as 
such under paragraph 106, which meant in practice that the rules on transfer 
system had to be amended. By basing its decision on free movement rules that 
were laid down in order to alleviate practices that impede cross-border trade, the 
CJEU had a specific vision of sport as part of European trade law.33 Even though 
article 45 TFUE covers EU citizens, the CJEU confirmed in the Kolpak34 and 
Simutenkov35 cases that athletes from a third country which has an agreement 
with the EU containing non-discriminatory measures, are to be treated equally 
to EU citizens.36
30 Ibid, para 100.
31 cRAiG, de búRcA (2015), p. 761.
32 dUVAl (2016), p. 86.
33 weAtheRill (2010), p. 485.
34 CJCE, 08.05.2003, Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Maros Kolpak, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:255.
35 CJCE, 12.04.2005, Case C-265/03, Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real 
Federación Española de Fútbol, ECLI:EU:C:2005:213. 
36 RAbU (2010), p. 397.
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IV. The effect of the Commission on the interaction between 
competition law and contractual freedom
Until the Bosman ruling, the European Commission had chosen to follow a 
policy of persuasion of the clubs through dialogue instead of taking a more ac-
tive stand in relation to the discriminatory rules of the national Leagues, enacted 
by the regulations of international football federations regarding foreign players, 
because of the political sensitivity of the issue.37 The industry had still strong 
national identities while at the same time operating internationally on a business 
model basis. At the same time, discriminatory labour practices in the private 
sector could in theory be challenged both under the free movement provisions 
and the European competition law. However, depending on the legal basis of 
the demand, the private enforcement opportunities offered to individuals before 
national courts are different and so are the Commission’s power in safeguarding 
the internal market law.
The Commission has no power to enforce the freedom of movement of 
workers against private parties. It can only initiate infringement proceedings 
against the Member States that have failed to fulfil a Treaty obligation, there-
fore requiring them to adjust their national legislation which is considered to be 
contrary to European law. In the case of football and the discriminatory clauses 
based on nationality laid down in national labour contracts, a Commission’s in-
tervention could be in theory possible but also politically and legally delicate. This 
was voiced by the AG Trabucchi in his Opinion in the Donà case who rejected 
«the principle that the State should be made liable for activities carried out on 
its territory by individuals exercising their contractual autonomy solely on the 
ground that they have adopted measures which conflict with directly applicable 
Community rules».38 As far as football is concerned, the State’s role was, ac-
cording to the AG, to uphold the right of private parties, the sports clubs, to sign 
on foreign workers and to withhold legal recognition from a clause to the contra-
ry contained in the rules applicable to them. The contractual autonomy of private 
parties and their liberty to insert clauses that may be contrary to European law 
belongs exclusively to the sphere of private law according to AG Trabucchi and 
therefore there is no legal liability for the public authorities of the Member States. 
The liability of the State in case of infringement of Treaty provisions by pri-
vate parties was mostly examined in cases evolving European competition law. 
According to the case law of the CJEU at the time, a Member State should not 
37 GRAyson (2015), p. 213; VAn RompUy (2012), p. 300.
38 Opinion of the Advocate-General Trabucchi delivered on 6 July 1976, Case 13/76, Gaetano Donà v. 
Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:104.
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support infringement of European law by private parties by legislating purported-
ly to sanction or to encourage the illegality or by creating the legal conditions that 
would leave a Treaty infringement immune from any kind of control of legality.39 
If the national legislation was challenged as being contrary to European law be-
fore a national court of a Member State and that court refused to proceed to a 
conformity control, then that Member State would be liable and exposed to the 
infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission for failing to fulfil a Treaty 
obligation. 
Regarding the enforcement of European competition law laid down in arti-
cles 101 TFEU40 (ex article 81 TEC) and 102 TFEU41 (ex article 82 TEC) against 
private parties, including the transnational and national football federations, the 
Commission had much more specific powers. According to the rules on proce-
dure, powers of investigation and variety of decisions available to the Commis-
sion laid down by Regulation 17/6242 the Commission had the unique authority 
39 CJCE, 01.10.1987, Case C-311/85, ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. ASBL Sociale 
Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, ECLI:EU:C:1987:418; CJCE, 30.04.1986, 
joints cases C-209-213/84, Ministère Public v. Lucas Asjes et alii, ECLI:EU:C:1986:188.
40 Article 101 TFEU states that
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or 
indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, 
markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant 
to this Article shall be automatically void. 3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared 
inapplicable in the case of: – any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, – any 
decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, – any concerted practice or cate-
gory of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or 
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
41 Article 102 TFEU states that
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions 
to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvan-
tage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplemen-
tary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.
42 Council Regulation 17/62/EEC, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1962, 
O.J. L13, 21.2.1962, p. 204. 
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to exempt a restrictive agreement under article 101(3) TFEU (ex article 81(3) 
TEC) but only after notification of the agreement by the parties. In the case of 
football, the national clubs would have to notify their employment contract drafts 
with professional players and other rules to the Commission. If the Commission 
considered that they were in breach of the competition rules, it could demand 
the termination of the anticompetitive practice and/or impose a fine. 
Despite the inactivity of the Commission in the early years of the football 
industry, both the Treaty’s provisions on free movement and competition have a 
horizontal direct effect which means that player restrictions could be challenged 
before national courts following the procedures set on every Member State ac-
cording to the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States.43 However, 
an exemption of the anticompetitive practice under article 101(3) TFEU (ex article 
81(3) TEC) is available in restrictive practices concerning the commercialisation 
of goods and services or, in other words, revenue-generating activities,44 but 
may not include labour. In general, compensation and other employment con-
ditions are often negotiated within the framework of collective or tariff agree-
ments between the labour unions and employer organisations known as the 
social partners. Collective agreements can be excluded from the application of 
competition law only if they meet the conditions laid down in the Albany case.45 
The agreement must be the product of collective bargaining between the social 
partners in the form of a binding collective agreement, it must not include hidden 
restrictions of competition and it must incorporate only socio-political aims such 
as employment and working conditions. However, if the agreement incorporates 
conditions that go beyond the rights and obligations in the employer-employee 
relationship and affects third parties or markets, such as clients, suppliers, com-
peting employers or consumers, it cannot be exempted and has to be assessed 
on the basis of article 101 TFEU.46 Since the organisational rules of transnational 
football bodies were not qualified as collective agreements but were, however, 
imposing conditions in the employment contracts of their members effecting 
competing clubs and federations, the Commission would have to find a way to 
control them under competition provisions.
The question of compatibility of organisational rules with EU competition law 
was analysed in the Bosman case. Even though the CJEU declined to answer 
the national court’s question on the compatibility of the transfer rules with articles 
43 schepel (2013).
44 piJetloVic (2016).
45 CJCE, 21.09.1999, Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Tex-
tielindustrie, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430. 
46 dRiGUez (2006); säcKeR (2008).
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101 TFEU and 102 TFEU, the opinion of the AG Lenz in that ruling47 offered the 
legal framework under which the European competition law could be specifically 
applicable to sport, at a time when the EU had no specific legal or institutional 
competence over the sport sector yet. In his legal analysis AG Lenz defined 
football clubs as undertakings48 and the football federations as associations 
of undertakings (national federations) or associations of associations of under- 
takings (UEFA and FIFA). Therefore, the organisational rules that also effect the 
drafting of employment contracts for professional players, imposed by UEFA or 
the national federations, were interpreted by the AG as decisions of associations 
of undertakings or agreements between undertakings (the clubs). He concluded 
that the transfer rules could have an effect on trade between Member States. 
According to the AG «those rules replace the normal system of supply and de-
mand by a uniform machinery which leads to the existing competition situation 
being preserved and the clubs being deprived of the possibility of making use 
of the chances, with respect to the engagement of players, which would be 
available to them under normal competitive conditions».49 As far as the transfer 
fees are concerned, the tendency to maintain the existing competition situation 
was according to AG Lenz inherent in the system that impedes fair competition 
between the football clubs. This opinion has reportedly «inspired the European 
Commission to pro-actively use EU competition law as a source of political and 
legal leverage to obtain a reform of the FIFA RSTP».50
The Bosman ruling qualified international sport bodies as undertakings and 
their organisational rules as agreements between undertakings, which meant 
that they were subject to the Commission’s control under European competition 
law following the procedure laid down by Regulation no. 17/62. After this ruling, 
the Commission felt empowered to formally challenge FIFA’s organisational rules 
under competition law. In 1997 FIFA notified its amended RSTP to the Com-
mission for a compatibility evaluation with European competition law. FIFA had 
abolished the transfer fees for out-of-contract players but in the Commission’s 
opinion the economic effect of maintaining the transfer fees for in-contract play-
ers would still restrict competition. Therefore, it issued a statement of objections 
addressed to FIFA stating this concern. A statement of objections is the official 
notification to the undertakings under competition proceedings that a prohibition 
47 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz delivered on 20 September 1995, Case C-415/93, Union Roy-
ale Belge des sociétés de Football Association et alii v. Bosman et alii, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293.
48 The CJEU case law has established that «the concept of an undertaking encompasses every en-
tity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it 
is financed» see CJCE, 23.04.1991, Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:161.
49 Ibid, para 262.
50 dUVAl (2016), p. 89.
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decision finding an infringement of EU competition law was about to be made, 
potentially accompanied by a high fine. Undertakings have the right to negotiate 
and offer remedies to the Commission in order to address its concerns as laid 
down to the statement of objection. This negotiation could lead either to informal 
settlements or commitment decisions under Regulation no. 17/62. 
In the 1999 Commission’s guidelines on the application of competition rules 
to sport51 we find some of the reasons for the Commission to challenge FIFA’s 
transfer rules. Amongst those reasons we find that the clubs (undertakings) had 
decided together how the system of fixing and paying the transfer fee will work. 
They had therefore given up the freedom of clubs to hire players by transfer 
without a fee or in return for a fee that is calculated objectively on the basis of 
real costs incurred by the old club for training and promoting the players. Clubs 
had also given up the possibility of hiring players who have unilaterally terminat-
ed their contract, therefore conserving the transfer system as it is. In the Com-
mission’s opinion the fact that these rules applied to all international transfers of 
players within the European Union, as well as the fact that the fees are fixed too 
high, or even at exorbitant levels for best players are «sufficient demonstration 
that their purpose and effect is significantly to restrict or to distort competition on 
the market in professional football matches staged by the first-division clubs in 
the Community and the EEA».52 Also, the ban on transfers following a unilateral 
termination of a contract by a player in cases where the player has fulfilled all 
obligations under national employment law, as well as the standard employment 
contract between players and clubs represent a violation of the European pro-
visions on free movement of workers because such measures can restrict the 
right of free movement of young athletes. Hence, FIFA should withdraw its ban 
on the transfer of players who have unilaterally terminated their contract, provid-
ed that they have fulfilled their contractual obligations under national law. 
Following the statement of objections, negotiations between the football in-
dustry and the Commission started in order to find a common ground and in 
2001 a joint FIFA/UEFA Task Force was created in order to work on devising a 
reform proposal that would be acceptable by all stakeholders and in conform-
ity with European competition law.53 The Commission and the football industry 
came to an agreement in 2001 that ended the competition proceedings and 
laid down the principles that influenced the current structure of the international 
transfer system of football players. Amongst those principles, the ones with spe-
cial interest in regards to players employment contracts are those that provide 
51 European Commission, 1999, Preliminary guidelines on the application of the competition rules to 
sport, Internal Memo O/99/59, SEC (1999) 249.
52 Ibid, para 30.
53 pARRish (2003), p. 142; VAn den boGAeRt (2005), p. 230.
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for: the creation of one transfer period per season, and a further limited mid-sea-
son window, with a limit of one transfer per player per season; the minimum and 
maximum duration of contracts of respectively 1 and 5 years; the contracts to be 
protected for a period of 3 years up to the age of 28 and 2 years thereinafter; for 
the system of sanctions to be implemented in a way that preserves the regularity 
and proper functioning of sporting competition so that unilateral breaches of 
contract are only possible at the end of a season; for a financial compensation 
to be paid if a contract is breached unilaterally by the player or the club; and for 
proportionate sporting sanctions to be applied to players, clubs or agents in the 
case of unilateral breaches of contract without just cause during the protected 
period.54 Under the new Regulation no. 1/200355 on European competition law 
procedures, undertakings have a larger operating framework to propose reme-
dies and put an end to the competition proceedings by an official commitment 
decision.
V. The effect of transnational football bodies on transnational 
mechanisms of dispute resolution 
According to the European Commission, sport, in general, has a huge eco-
nomic impact in the EU: €407 billion in 2004, representing 3.7% of the EU 
GDP and employing 15 million persons (5.4% of the labour force).56 The finan-
cial transformation of the clubs over the years and the liberalisation of labour 
migration for footballers had as a consequence an extreme increase in players’ 
wages creating a gap between the top clubs and the lower leagues.57 This sit-
uation can create obstacles in the functioning of the football market due to the 
lack of an effective social dialogue for collective agreements in the industry and 
of truly representative social partners.58 The Lisbon Treaty tried to fill this gap by 
establishing a supporting competence for the EU in the sport sector in articles 
165 and 166 TFEU. These articles legitimated the EU’s role in taking initiatives 
to promote sporting issues that are limited to incentive measures, excluding 
any legislative harmonisation. It also officialised the submission of international 
54 Commission Press Release (2001), Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA/
UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers, IP/01/314, in http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-01-314_en.htm (15.01.2018).
55 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Council Regulation of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003, O.J. L1, 04.01.2003, p. 1.
56 European Commission DG Competition (2017), EU competition policy and the sports sector, in http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html (15.1.2018).
57 AndReFF (2016); coGnARd (2012).
58 pRimAUlt (2016); o’leARy (2017), p. 157.
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sporting bodies to the internal market law control and the proportionality prin-
ciple. However, article 165 (1) TFEU stipulates that the EU must take account 
of the specific nature of sport, a notion that allows transnational bodies to pass 
rules and regulations that would be otherwise accepted with difficulty by the 
European institutions in other economic sectors.59 These rules and regulations 
affect the contractual freedom of players and clubs. The lack of harmonisation 
of labour law and contract law in Member States could make the resolution of 
contractual disputes between players and clubs before national civil courts a 
very long and costly procedural battle.60 
Employment contracts of professional players must be in conformity with 
the national legislation of the country where the club is registered and its courts 
have competence over breaches of contractual agreements. However, the or-
ganisational rules of FIFA create a parallel system of transnational labour and 
contract law norms. In the case of a contractual disagreement the FIFA RSTP 
designs three bodies for dispute resolution concerning its regulations. First, the 
Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter DRC) that is composed by 24 mem-
bers in total, half of them being players’ representatives and the other half clubs 
representatives, appointed by the FIFA Executive Committee on the proposal 
of the players’ associations and clubs or leagues. This body is competent for 
resolving disputes between clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of 
contractual stability where there has been a request for an International Trans-
fer Certificate, employment-related disputes between a club and a player of an 
international dimension and disputes relating to training compensation and the 
solidarity mechanism. Second, the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter PSC) 
that is composed according to the procedure laid down on the Rules governing 
the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution 
Chamber61 and its president and vice-president must be members of the Exec-
utive Committee. It is competent to deal with employment disputes involving a 
coach and an association and a club, disputes between clubs that don’t fall in 
the scope of DRC’s competence and disputes linked to the issuing of an Inter-
national Transfer Certificate. The above – mentioned bodies are internal to FIFA’s 
structure and they adjudicate in the presence of at least three members unless 
the case is considered of a simple nature and can be dealt by a single judge. 
59 weAtheRill (2012).
60 CJCE, 16.03.2010, Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Olivier Bernard and Newcastle 
UFC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143 ; Cass. Soc., 6 oct. 2010, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Olivier Bernard, 
Newcastle UFC, Bull. civ., V, n° 07-42023.
61 La Fédération Internationale de Football Association-FIFA.com (2017), Rules Governing the Proce-
dures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber, in http://resources.fifa.com/
mm/document/affederation/administration/02/92/54/28/rulesgoverningtheproceduresoftheplayersstatus-
committeeandthedisputeresolutionchamberdezember2017_neutral.pdf (15.01.2018).
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The members of the DRC designate amongst themselves one single judge for 
the players and one for the clubs. If the single judge of the DRC considers that 
the case involves «fundamental issues» the case can be referred to the chamber. 
The single judge of the PSC is its Chairman or a person appointed by him or her. 
The decisions of these two bodies may be appealed within specific delays 
before the third dispute resolution mechanism which is the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (hereinafter CAS). FIFA introduced an arbitration clause in favour of the 
CAS in its statutes in 2002. Each club or player that participates in DRC or PSC 
proceedings, without raising any direct objection regarding the CAS arbitration 
clause or the jurisdiction of the DRC and the PSC, is bound by a CAS arbitration 
clause, according to the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal. Awards 
of CAS can be challenged by the parties before the Swiss Federal Tribunal un-
der very strict conditions, which makes the CAS a de facto ultimate arbiter of 
matters involving the FIFA RSTP.62 The voluntary character of arbitration does 
not prevent the parties from recourse to national courts. This was also part of 
the Agreement between the Commission and the football industry that followed 
Bosman and aimed at safeguarding the due process rights of the persons af-
fected by the RSTP. 
FIFA’s RSTP article 22 stipulates that FIFA is competent to hear claims based 
on the RSTP without prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress 
before a civil court for employment related disputes. Despite the option offered 
to parties to bring their case before a national court, the majority of transnational 
labour disputes arising from the professional football employment field are dealt 
by FIFA’s dispute resolution bodies. Some of the reasons for this concentration 
is that these bodies follow fast procedures at a very low cost when compared 
to traditional labour disputes before national courts. Also, a possible bias of a 
national court in favour of one of the two parties is, at least in theory, less plau-
sible in a transnational environment.63 Most important, players and clubs use 
FIFA’s dispute resolution bodies as a way to claim exorbitant salaries or dam-
ages that would otherwise be difficult to prove and justify before national labour 
proceedings. Especially in cases of international transfers, if there is a pending 
contractual dispute between the player and his former club, the former football 
association must refuse to provide the ITC and the player and/or his new club 
will have to turn to the PSC to obtain a provisory registration with the new club. 
If there are no pending national proceedings, the DRC will automatically have the 
62 RiGozzi (2010), p. 263.
63 dUVAl (2016), p. 99.
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competence to adjudicate the contractual dispute. If the player or the club have 
turned to the national courts the DRC will refuse to adjudicate the case to avoid 
parallel process and forum shopping.64
VI. Conclusion 
The liberalisation of an economic sector such as sports without its submis-
sion to a conformity control under substantive law can have negative economic 
and social impacts in a free market economy. In order to avoid distortion of 
competition, the raise of burden of debt for clubs, social dumping and forum 
shopping, the EU has been engaging in a long and difficult dialogue with the 
stakeholders of the football industry in order to create the framework to con-
trol transnational sporting norms under EU internal market law.65 The funding of 
players’ wages and transfer fees varies considerably between countries within 
the EU and outside. In the absence of a transnational labour law or contract law 
most of the contractual disputes are often resolved via arbitration.66 
The European Commission tries to engage the transnational bodies in a so-
cial dialogue that can offer some minimum protection for players. After a joint re-
quest by FIFPro and the representatives of the European Professional Leagues, 
a social dialogue committee was established in 2008 that resulted in an agree-
ment in 2012 on minimum requirements in standard players’ contracts and fur-
ther discussions are planned.67 The Commission also promoted the Financial 
Fair Play in 2010 within UEFA that does not allow for the clubs which participate 
in European competitions to spend more money than they earn, in a way to es-
tablish a monetary cap that should provide balance to the football market. The 
UEFA Executive Committee approved the formation of the two-chamber Club 
Financial Control Body (CFCB) in June 2012 to oversee the application of the 
UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations.68 In these initiatives the 
Commission sees an alternative source of global regulation in the absence of a 
global state but also a legitimation of its actions and initiatives to promote the 




67 pARRish (2016); mièGe (2017), p. 275.
68 The Union of European Football Associations-UEFA.com (2017), Protecting the game: Financial Fair 
Play, in https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-financial-fair-play/index.
html (15.01.2018).
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